

Dominion Serv-U Cover-Up

May 10, 2024

These lying idiots at Dominion were running an exploitable Serv-U FTP server on their public-facing dvsfileshare.dominionvoting.com IP address. When they got caught, they took place in a 17-hour cover-up operation. They initially took their page down, then edited it so it didn't show the SolarWinds name, just leaving Serv-U (but the morons left it in the page source code), then later they removed even the Serv-U portion, but still again left SolarWinds in the page source code (they weren't smart enough to remove it entirely). If they can't even figure out how to cover their tracks on something this simple, they have no business writing software to handle our elections. Not to mention, innocent people DO NOT TRY TO CONCEAL THINGS LIKE THIS!



Then everyone freaked out because of the SolarWinds Orion Platform hack and Dominion misdirected all the plebs at that and then claimed they don't use Orion. What the plebs didn't realize is that there was ALSO a zero-day exploit on the Serv-U 'FTP' software that Dominion was using up until and at that time, and they bought the BS from Dominion, hook, line, and sinker. Nobody that falls for this should be using electronic voting systems (or much less, anything electronic). I don't mean to come down on those deceived by Dominion, but at some point they do need to take responsibility for not having enough knowledge to protect a domain that they claim to be responsible or making decisions for. It is UNFAIR to put them in these positions, but it is important to notify them that they ARE in these positions so they can't claim ignorance after being put on friendly notice.

So let's walk through it. First, sometimes people at Dominion are honest, and I am happy to point that out when I see it.

From: Eric Coomer
Sent: Thursday, January 23, 2020 12:10 AM
To: Sheree R. Noell
Subject: Re: AK - ICP modems failing acceptance testing

Eric nails it again.

We suck

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720.201.1728MOBILE

Eric is not a stupid person by any means. I do wish he used his intelligence to help his fellow man, though.

From: Eric Coomer
Sent: Thursday, January 23, 2020 5:32 PM
To: Sheree R. Noell
Subject: Re: PAN - ICX Safe Mode

He is ABSOLUTELY
CORRECT, based on
what I see in this
document.

We are so broken all over the place

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Based on the evidence I have seen that clearly Eric knows about, as he is listed as a sender and/or recipient of many of the emails that shed a bright light on what is going on inside Dominion that those who blindly trust them don't know about, Eric Coomer's conclusion in the above email is very accurate.

Let's begin with the information regarding this particular Zero-Day Exploit directly from SolarWinds themselves: <https://www.solarwinds.com/trust-center/security-advisories/cve-2021-35211> (PDF [Serv-U-Remote-Memory-Escape-Vulnerability.pdf](#))

Serv-U Remote Memory Escape Vulnerability (CVE-2021-35211)

Security Vulnerability

Released: July 9, 2021

Last updated: July 15, 2021

Assigning CNA: SolarWinds

Security Advisory Summary

UPDATE July 15, 2021: You can [Subscribe to this RSS Feed](#) to be notified when we update this page (note: you will need to cut and paste the "Subscribe to this RSS feed" URL into an RSS Feed Reader, e.g., Outlook's RSS Subscriptions, to monitor updates).

UPDATE July 13, 2021: We've provided additional indicators of compromise (IOCs) below. You can also find additional details on the threat actor and their findings in a [blog post](#) from Microsoft.

UPDATE July 10, 2021: NOTE: This security vulnerability only affects Serv-U Managed File Transfer and Serv-U Secure FTP and does not affect any other SolarWinds or N-able (formerly SolarWinds MSP) products.

SolarWinds was recently notified by Microsoft of a security vulnerability related to [Serv-U Managed File Transfer Server](#) and [Serv-U Secured FTP](#) and have developed a hotfix to resolve this vulnerability. While Microsoft's research indicates this vulnerability exploit involves a limited, targeted set of customers and a single threat actor, our joint teams have mobilized to address it quickly.

The vulnerability exists in the latest Serv-U version 15.2.3 HF1 released May 5, 2021, and all prior versions. A threat actor who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with privileges. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or run programs on the affected system.

Advisory Details

Severity

9.0 Critical

Advisory ID

CVE-2021-35211

First Published

07/09/2021

Last Updated

07/15/2021

Fixed Version

Serv-U 15.2.3 HF2

Main / Vulnerability Database / SolarWinds / Serv-U FTP Server / 15.2.3 HF1

Search vulnerability database



☐ With exploit

☐ With patch

Vulnerabilities in Serv-U FTP Server 15.2.3 HF1

HTML injection in SolarWinds Serv-U 06 Dec, 2023

Low Patched

Information disclosure in SolarWinds Serv-U 05 Jun, 2023

Low Patched

XSS in SolarWinds Serv-U 23 Nov, 2022

Low Patched

LDAP injection in SolarWinds Serv-U 17 Jan, 2022

Low Patched

Remote code execution in SolarWinds Serv-U 13 Jul, 2021

Critical Patched

Multi-factor authentication bypass in SolarWinds Serv-U 22 Aug, 2023

Low Patched

Hard-coded cryptographic key in Serv-U FTP Server 21 Dec, 2022

Medium Patched

Improper access control in SolarWinds Serv-U 18 May, 2022

Low Patched

Multiple vulnerabilities in SolarWinds Serv-U 09 Dec, 2021

Medium Patched



Another site: [SolarWinds patches critical Serv-U vulnerability exploited in the wil_ – www.bleepingcomputer.com.pdf](#)

On December 13, 2020, [CISA](#) the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency charged with keeping our elections secure, came out with this:



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ED 21-01: Mitigate SolarWinds Orion Code Compromise

December 13, 2020

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Valeri Shilov (IT Operations Support in San Francisco CA) sent an email to David Moren and Travis Kester of Dominion Voting Systems regarding Dominion's public fileshare running on SolarWinds:

From: Shilov, Valeri (REG) <valeri.shilov@sfgov.org>
Sent: Monday, December 14, 2020 12:54 PM
To: David Moreno <david.moreno@dominionvoting.com>
Cc: Travis Kester <travis.kester@dominionvoting.com>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] SolarWinds fileshare

Hi David,

With the SolarWinds breach news yesterday, our CIO just sent me a note about the public DVS fileshare running on SolarWinds.

<https://dvsfileshare.dominionvoting.com/Web%20Client/Mobile/MLogin.htm>


<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html>

Hope all is well.


Thank you,

December 14, 2020 23:59, prior to the cover-up, their public file-sharing site looked like this:


BINGO! Potential MASSIVE breach prior to 2020 Election!!! Did Dominion notify ANYONE prior to the election? Why didn't Election Officials know? Why didn't the public know? Why did they keep this hidden?



I'll zoom in for you:




The source code for their website ([20201214235952_https__dvsfileshare.dominionvoting.com_Web Client_Mobile_MLogin.htm](https://web.archive.org/web/20201214235952/https://dvsfileshare.dominionvoting.com/Web%20Client/Mobile/MLogin.htm)) also shows SolarWinds, which is responsible for being displayed in what you see just above:




404 Not Found

Then sometime before December 15, 2020 03:02, they remove SolarWinds:




I'll zoom in again:



Their website source code

(20201215030252_https__dvsfileshare.dominionvoting.com_Web Client_Mobile_MLogin.htm) however, still has remnants of SolarWinds:




The screenshot shows a text editor window titled "20201215030252_https__dvsfileshare.dominionvoting.com_Web Client_Mobile_MLogin.htm". The editor displays HTML code with various attributes and tags. A search bar on the right side of the editor shows the search term "solarwinds". The search results indicate 3 matches in the entire file. The search options are set to "Normal" search mode, "Wrap around", and "Match whole word only". The search results show the following matches:


- Match 1: `<a class="html-attribute-value html-external-link" target="_blank" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20201215030252/http://www.solarwinds.com/?CMP=PRD-TAD-SW-MFT_INPRD-MFT-PP" rel="nofollow noopener">`
- Match 2: `<a class="html-attribute-value html-external-link" target="_blank" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20201215030252/http://www.solarwinds.com/?CMP=PRD-TAD-SW-MFT_INPRD-MFT-PP" rel="nofollow noopener">`
- Match 3: `<a class="html-attribute-value html-external-link" target="_blank" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20201215030252/http://www.solarwinds.com/?CMP=PRD-TAD-SW-MFT_INPRD-MFT-PP" rel="nofollow noopener">`

The status bar at the bottom of the editor shows "Hyper Text Markup Language file length: 85,857 lines: 3", "Ln: 3 Col: 67,869 Sel: 10|1", "Unix (LF)", "UTF-8", and "INS".

Then later in the same day at 16:48, they decide to remove Serv-U to try to cover that up as well:



And again, I'll zoom in:




However, their website source code (<https://dvsfileshare.dominionvoting.com/WebClient/Mobile/MLogin.htm>) still shows SolarWinds everywhere:


[illegible]

I certainly hope it wasn't Eric Coomer that was responsible for trying to cover up the fact that they were using SolarWinds Serv-U from the public, because if it was, I guess Eric is including himself in the "we" he claims "sucks". So in summary, over a 17 hour period:


Dec 14 2020 23:59



Dec 15 2020 03:02



Dec 15 2020 16:48



Dominion, in all the time you spent covering up your use of a compromised product on one of your public-facing file-sharing websites (and you know what files you shared on it), did you notify any government agencies about that? Did you notify any election officials? I would LOVE to ask you a lot more questions as well in a very public setting.

